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Several attempts have been made to impose liability on private
parties for the harms caused by their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Examples of such litigation in the United States include a case
1
brought by northeastern states against several electricity producers
and a suit filed by the State of California against six automobile manu2
facturers in late 2006. In addition to building on a broad tradition of
tort law being used in response to other environmental damages, such
litigation draws on the experience of the American tobacco settlement
and on recent attempts to use liability as an alternative to legislative
gun control.
Three rationales have been offered for liability as climate change
policy. First, litigation might be desirable for the compensation that it
provides to victims of climate change. Second, liability might create
incentives for private actors to reduce GHGs. Finally, these lawsuits
might make political conditions more favorable to ex ante public
policies for GHG reduction. This Commentary addresses the desirability of each of these effects in turn.
I. COMPENSATION FOR HARMS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE
Compensation may be desirable from either the perspective of
economic efficiency or of fairness, but strong arguments may also be
made that it is undesirable from both of these perspectives.
Although arguments for compensation usually hinge on fairness,
an efficiency argument might be made for compensation. People potentially harmed by climate change might be willing to pay for the
ability to reduce the variance in their well being as a result of climate
change. Although some variance, such as that caused by local storms,
may be managed through conventional insurance markets, Howard
Kunreuther and Erwann Michel-Kerjan argue that these markets may
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not handle aggregate risks, such as the risk of rapid climate change or
3
of catastrophic regional storms. If so, compensation for some harm
through legal liability might help smooth well being across states of
the world and thus improve total welfare.
However, as is well known, compensation may be inefficient if it
weakens the incentives to avoid harm and thus raises social costs of
4
climate change. Recent research suggests that adapting to climate
change should be an important part of any response strategy. Examples of such adaptations include building sea walls to reduce the damages from sea level rise and adjusting agricultural infrastructure to
shifting crop zones. Gary Yohe and Michael Schlesinger estimate the
costs of sea level rise in the United States to be approximately thirty
5
percent lower with private adaptation than without. Compensation,
even if only partial, will weaken incentives for private and public sector investments in adaptation and thus substantially increase the costs
of climate change.
A stronger justification for compensation would focus on fairness
rather than efficiency. Daniel Farber makes persuasive arguments of
6
this nature. However, it is possible that the redistribution that would
occur under a liability regime would be undesirable. Rules for assessing damage based on lost property values would strongly favor the
rich. For example, in the United States, the property value losses
from sea level rise would likely be concentrated among wealthier
households who own high-value coastal real estate. Firms may raise
energy prices to pay for compensation, however, so the burden of
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compensating those harmed by climate change is likely to be regres7
sive. Thus, litigation could create a net transfer to wealthy households.
II. GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION
Another justification for liability is that it might bring about GHG
reductions. One way to achieve this goal would be to abandon compensation for victims and require defendants to invest in projects that
create environmental improvements. Remedies might be similar to
Supplemental Environmental Projects, which are used intensively in
enforcing American federal environmental laws and require violators
8
to improve the natural resources harmed by their violations. For climate change, spending might include carbon sequestration projects,
such as reforestation.
One question about this design is whether it increases spending
on these public goods or just crowds out government financing. Examining the effects of the tobacco settlement, Monica Singhal found
that states’ propensity to spend on tobacco control programs from the
settlement was low—only twenty cents on the dollar, with the remainder treated as ordinary government revenue. However, their propensity to spend on these programs out of other revenue was zero, so the
9
settlement has affected spending to some degree.
Another strategy is to use liability to generate desirable effects on
ex ante pollution decisions. If defendants must pay damages that depend on GHG releases, liability would create an incentive to reduce
emissions, at least for damages that are prospective at the time of the
settlement. Along these lines, Joni Hersch and Kip Viscusi point to
10
the effective tax created by the tobacco settlement. Kirsten Engel
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makes the connection to ex ante policy even more explicit by suggesting that the remedy should compel polluters to participate in tradable
11
GHG permit markets. Another approach would be more similar to
command-and-control ex ante regulation. Remedies might require
changes in production techniques, such as a shift to lower-carbon
electricity generation, or changes in product characteristics, such as
an increase in the fuel efficiency of motor vehicles.
The problems with these approaches have been discussed by several authors, so I mention briefly only two that seem of particular concern. First, litigation seems poorly equipped to handle leakage—the
possibility that greenhouse-gas-intensive activities will relocate to jurisdictions with less restrictive controls. Leakage is a difficult problem
for conventional tax and permit programs, but the government may
be able to make adjustments (for example, an “embedded carbon”
tariff on imports) to address industrial mobility. Given the necessarily
limited number of defendants in any lawsuit, however, it will be even
more difficult to avoid substantial leakage with legal remedies.
Second, the accumulative nature of GHGs means that controls are
effective only if they remain in place over long time horizons. The
need for long-term, time-consistent policies is a challenge for all responses, but seems especially difficult for restrictions that result from
a one-time legal settlement. In particular, it will be difficult for legal
remedies to update the baselines used to gauge compliance, as may be
necessary because of unforeseeable changes over time in economic
conditions or technology. Ongoing enforcement and updating is
more compatible with a regulatory approach.
III. EFFECTS ON PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION
Given the likely inefficiency of liability, perhaps it is best thought
of as an indirect mechanism: liability may improve the political feasibility of ex ante public policies arrived at through legislation and
regulation. The process of creating public policy may be viewed as a
Nash bargaining game, in which the outcome of a negotiation besettlement was structured in such a way that it operated like a $0.40 per pack tax on
cigarettes (citing W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 4, 41 (2002))).
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tween parties depends on the “threat points” that represent the outcome should they fail to reach agreement. In this game, parties with
interests in GHG control negotiate with those who expect to bear
costs. The status quo gives a strong threat point to parties that favor
limited climate change policy because they can expect to bear few
costs. If the status quo included the possibility of climate change liability, and ex ante public policy might substitute for that liability,
then their opposition to such public policy would subside.
Most analyses conclude that the United States currently spends
12
too little money on climate change mitigation.
Thus, a shift in
threat points to support a more aggressive climate policy would likely
be efficiency improving. If so, features of the threat point that would
otherwise reduce its efficiency actually become desirable. It could be
helpful that climate change litigation threatens to have high transaction costs, such as the high legal fees that could result from the legal
complexities discussed in this Symposium. Similarly, if defendants are
risk averse, uncertainty about the outcomes of the litigation and the
possible difficulty obtaining insurance coverage for these risks discussed by Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan might also be efficiency en13
hancing, although the risks’ direct effects would be costly.
A shift in threat points might affect not just the likelihood that
some climate change policy is implemented, but also the form that the
policy takes. Predicting the nature of these effects would require a detailed model of both the public policy bargaining game and the climate change liability that different parties could face. For example, if
political considerations affect the industries subject to lawsuits, they
could alter the form of any public policies negotiated in the shadow of
this threat. A formal model of the negotiation process would potentially be illuminating for these issues.
Even without a formal model, one can speculate that the threat of
climate change litigation may alter the political environment to per12
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mit a more efficient regulatory instrument to be chosen. The economics literature suggests large differences in the efficiency of alternative policy instruments for climate change. As is well known, incentive-based policies such as pollution taxes and tradable pollution
permits are more cost effective than traditional command-and-control
policies. Within the class of incentive-based policies, programs have
much lower costs if they raise revenue and the government uses this
revenue to lower distortionary taxes, such as taxes on labor and capital
income. Ian Parry and his coauthors show that failing to take advantage of this “revenue recycling” can dramatically reduce the net bene14
fits of a policy. Revenue-raising instruments include taxes and tradable permits that are auctioned; many tradable permit programs, such
as the popular cap-and-trade programs, do not fall into this category.
In addition, economists argue that environmental taxes are more effi15
cient than other policy instruments for climate change policy. The
argument is that policies, such as taxes, that target the marginal cost
of GHG abatement represent the best response to uncertainty in the
costs of GHG abatement.
Most current proposals for U.S. climate change policies do not use
the more efficient instruments. Although incentive-based proposals
have become common, these policies are most often cap-and-trade
programs, which do not raise revenue and target quantities rather
than marginal costs. One reason for the popularity of cap-and-trade
approaches is that permits may be given out in a way that offsets the
costs of the policy for some polluters or otherwise “buys off” the pol14

If the marginal environmental damage of one ton of carbon emitted is $75, a
policy with revenue recycling has twice the social benefit of a policy that does not recycle revenues. With lower levels of marginal environmental damage, the policy with
revenue recycling may be beneficial, whereas the same policy without revenue recycling will cause a welfare loss. Ian W.H. Parry et al., When Can Carbon Abatement Policies
Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets, 37 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 52, 54 (1999). Revenue recycling is only possible with policies such as carbon
taxes that raise revenue; however, carbon taxes do not imply revenue recycling because
their revenues may be used in less efficient ways.
15
The difference is based on Martin Weitzman’s “prices versus quantities” analysis
of government intervention under uncertainty. See Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs.
Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477, 485-87 (1974) (showing that, with uncertain costs,
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steeper slope. William A. Pizer, The Optimal Choice of Climate Change Policy in the Presence
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icy’s opponents. However, the need to make these concessions may
be weakened if some of these opponents will be liable for damages if
the parties fail to agree on a public policy alternative. Any revenueraising policy instrument might stand a better chance, with taxes at
least a possibility among these instruments. Thus, liability might
greatly increase the efficiency of climate change policy, even if used
only as a threat.
In conclusion, liability is unlikely to be the most desirable response to climate change, either for the compensation it provides or
for the GHG controls that might result from remedies. Liability is
only a second-best response, which may be valuable if traditional public policies are infeasible or, better still, if liability can make these public policies more feasible and more efficient.

16

However, in an empirical study of pollution permit allocation, Paul Joskow and
Richard Schmalensee conclude that the allocation of U.S. sulfur dioxide allowances
did not in fact favor regions that expected high costs, but rather played into more general national politics. See Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy
of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37, 79
(1998) (noting that “dirty” states—those with high sulfur dioxide emissions—“did relatively poorly” in the final allocation of emission credits, while states with “‘clout’ . . .
tended to do well”).

